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Bargaining, Arguing and 
Functional Differentiation of 
Decision-making: 
The Role of Committees in 
European Environmental 
Process Regulation 
Thomas Gehring* 
1. Introduction 
Committees play an important role in the European Community.1 In 
quantitative terms, the estimated number of committees existing under the 
auspices of the Community institutions ranges between several hundred to 
a thousand. The committees are regularly attended by more than 50,000 
people: scientists, civil servants and representatives of interest groups.2 In 
qualitative terms, committees provide the foundation for "bureaucratic" 
integration theories that emphasise the emergence of a European bureau-
cratic elite5 or envisage the "fusion" of national and European state 
bureaucracies.4 Based on empirical investigations into committee decision-
making in the foodstuffs sector, the members of the Bremen research 
project have not only claimed that governance by committees is located 
somewhere between intergovernmentalism and supranationalisirp but they 
also believe that some core institutional features of the EC should be read 
as "supranational versions of deliberationist ideals"/' In combination with 
Lecturer in International Relations, Department of Political Science, Free University 
Berlin and Faculty of Administrative Science, University of Konstanz. 
1
 See Bertram (1967); Grote (1990); Schaefer (1996). 
1
 See Falke (1996: 1.12-138); Buitendijk/van Schendelen (1995: 40-41!; Algien/Rometsch 
(1994: 137-141). 
!
 See Bach (1992). 4 See Wesscls (1992). 
5
 See ßücker et al (1996: 39, 45); Joerges/Neyer (1997a). 
6
 See Joerges/Neyer (1997b). 
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European law, committees are expected to transform "strategic interaction 
into deliberative problem-solving".7 In this way, a form of governance by 
committees emerges that need not necessarily reflect an awkward political 
compromise8 - in fact, it may approach a normative ideal that is not even 
attained within the political systems of the Member States. 
Committees therefore represent a particular form of institutionalised 
decision-making for European governance which is only just beginning to 
be understood. However, it remains largely unclear whether, and why, 
committees matter for European governance. They will generally be 
meaningful if they influence the outcomes of decision-making processes.9 
Thus, the question arises, how can committees affect decisions in ways that 
non-committee decision-making processes cannot, and in what kind of 
mechanism is their influence rooted? In particular, do the participating 
actors behave differently in committees than outside, and if so, why and 
under which conditions? This last question cannot be tackled without a 
distinct concept of interaction among the participating actors. 
A methodological problem is that the committees under the EC auspices 
are so diverse in their nature that it is difficult to develop a concept of 
"committee decision-making" which is meaningful.10 Whilst some commit-
tees consist of Member States' representatives (hereafter, the comitology 
committees), others constitute forums for interest groups or independent 
experts. Not only is the membership of these committees different, the 
opinions which these bodies adopt are of varying degrees of legal weight. 
Despite the multifarious nature of committees, they all share one feature in 
common: a committee is always embedded in, and therefore functionally 
dependent on, the overall decision-making process. Decision-making 
processes involving committees are sequenced in one way or another, so 
that the significance of a committee depends on its specific contribution to 
a larger decision-making process. 
This article explores the relevance of committees in European governance 
on the basis of two premises. First, it assumes that committees are part of 
overall decision-making processes and cannot readily be understood in isola-
tion from them. Second, it accepts that rational actors do not always act 
strategically according to their established interests but may, under certain 
circumstances, also engage in discursive deliberation. In Section 2 the article 
briefly develops the relevance of sequenced decision-making and introduces 
two diametrically opposed and ideally constructed modes of interaction 
among rational actors: "bargaining" and "arguing". Subsequently, the paper 
proceeds to examine the relevance of committee-based decision-making for 
" Joerges;Never (1997b), also (1997a) and Never (1997). 
See the frequent criticism of comitology decision-making referring to the exclusion of 
the European Parliament. See Grams (1995: 119-131). 
v
 See van Schendelen (1996: 29). 
111
 See van der Knaap (1996). 
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European environmental process regulation. Section 3 explores the consider-
able influence of an ad hoc advisory expert committee on the negotiation of 
the Drinking Water Directive of 1980." Section 4 compares three comitology 
committees in the area of environmental process regulation to examine their 
impact on the bargaining situation among the Member States. Section 5 
examines the informal functions that the comitology committees may fulfil if 
they meet on a regular basis to determine whether the institutional structure 
provides sufficient room for the exchange of arguments not immediately 
related to their own formal decision-making. 
2. The Influence of Committees in European Policy-Making 
Any evaluation of the role of committees in European policy-making 
cannot be limited to their internal decision-making arrangement. It must 
begin with the overall decision-making process of which committee inter-
action forms an important part. The negotiation-system among Member 
States within the Council constitutes the core component of the normal 
decision-making procedures laid down in Articles 189a, 189b and 189c EC. 
However, non-state actors, in particular the Commission and the European 
Parliament, may have an important impact on outcomes of this system. 
Therefore, the impact of European committees may be directed at two 
different points of reference. They may influence the intergovernmental 
core of European decision-making and modify the outcome of Council 
negotiations among the Member States. They may also affect the institu-
tional balance that exists between the Council (the Member States collec-
tively), Commission and Parliament. A committee that does not have an 
impact on either of these points of reference will be largely irrelevant for 
the EC system and therefore falls outside the scope of this article. 
The impact of committees on decisions is closely related to the 
functional differentiation of decision-making processes. It is difficult to 
believe that interaction in a committee will differ significantly, if it entirely 
replaces the normal decision-making process within the Council and deals 
with an identical set of issues. Thus, meaningful committees exist as satel-
lite bodies in addition to some parallel entities that are frequently 
positioned higher up in the overall institutional structure.'" A decision-
making process may be sequenced so that a committee intervenes either 
before or after these other entities act. The mandate of a committee may 
also be restricted to specific aspects of the general decision-making process 
so that the committee deals with a particular subset of relevant issues. 
Finally, the attendance of a committee may systematically differ from that 
" Council Directive XO'778/EEC on the quality of water for human consumption, (1980) 
OJ L 229/11. 
'- On the functional differentiation of decision-making processes, see Bora (1993). 
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of the normal decision-making process in order to fulfil its limited 
function. Thus, the more a committee differs in one or more of these three 
dimensions (sequence, mandate or attendance) from a (hypothetical) 
unitary decision-making process, the more the operation of a committee 
will deviate from the latter. 
In order to establish how a committee may alter the interaction among 
the key European institutions, it is necessary to investigate how these 
actors may interact. Assuming that corporate actors do not easily sacrifice 
advantages without reciprocal benefits, they may be expected usually to 
pursue their parochial interests within a Community legislative project. 
Accordingly, negotiations may be conceived of as "bargaining": the arm-
twisting type of interaction among rational utility maximisers to accom-
modate and balance established interests. Bargaining should be 
distinguished from unilateral action or competitive behaviour that rules 
out consensus. Actors bargain not only to collectively establish mutually 
beneficial co-operation but also to achieve an individually favourable 
distribution of these gains.13 The eventual outcome will largely rely on the 
distribution of bargaining power among the actors that depends, in turn, 
not least on the number of votes assigned to the Member States and the 
formal competences granted to the supranational actors. Allowing 
European committees to participate in decision-making procedures may 
influence the allocation of bargaining power within the European polity. It 
may also affect the boundaries of the decision-making situation and 
modify the preferences of actors14 even though there is no change in the 
mode of interaction among the participating actors. 
However, actors do not always bargain. If uncertainty prevails because 
of a lack of information or an inability to process the data, even rational 
utility maximisers may be motivated to question their preferences on the 
basis of convincing arguments or credible information. In complex situa-
tions, actors may also "argue": they attempt to convince their counterparts 
of the appropriateness of their own points of view. This type of interaction 
does not preclude actors from pursuing their own interests, but their influ-
ence on a collective outcome will be based on the provision of convincing 
arguments and not on power. In order to collectively remove uncertainty 
and settle initially disputed issues in a Habermasian type of discourse, 
actors must have recourse to undisputed criteria.15 European committees 
Hence, bargaining creates a tension between a collective and an individual interest that 
may cause the break-down of negotiations despite existing opportunities for mutually 
beneficial co-operation. See Scharpf (1992); Gehring (1996). 
Adding and subtracting issues is a well-known instrument to influence the probability 
of successful co-operation. See Sebenius (1983). 
' M n a Habermasian type of discourse, actors settle disputes essentially by individually 
invoking and collectively applying undisputed criteria located at a higher level of abstrac-
tion. See Habermas (1973). On the distinction between the interaction modes of "arguing" 
and "bargaining", see Gehring (1996). 
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may provide the forum for this type of interaction based on the exchange 
of arguments. This function does not rely on formal decision powers. To be 
meaningful, it merely requires that conclusions are successfully introduced 
into the formal decision-making process. 
The two ideally constructed interaction modes of "bargaining" and 
"arguing" fulfil very different functions within a comprehensive decision-
making process.16 The former provides a mechanism for the accommoda-
tion of established interests in comparatively clear-cut situations, while the 
latter supports the collective removal of uncertainty and affects the defini-
tion of interests. Unfortunately, they require very different behaviour. 
Arguing presupposes the willingness of the participating actors to question 
their own views and, if necessary, modify their preferences. In contrast, 
successful bargaining relies on fixed preferences. Where the modes of inter-
action are deployed simultaneously, interference will occur. 
European committees matter primarily because they influence the organi-
sation of decision-making processes. Furthermore, they may also affect the 
mode of interaction among the participating actors, if the sequenced 
approach characterising committee-supported decision-making contributes 
to separating interaction in the arguing-mode from interaction in the 
bargaining-mode and promotes deliberative consensus-building, rather than 
the power-based pursuit of parochial interests.17 Yet, the mere existence of a 
committee does not ensure that arguing dominates over bargaining. 
3. The Influence of an Advisory Expert Committee; 
the Case of the Expert Group on Drinking Water 
Committees may operate as advisory bodies within a broader decision-
making process. In this function, a committee does not need any formal 
decision-making competences. However, its advice will only be meaningful 
if it is integrated into the formal decision-making process. The specific way 
of embedding an advisory committee in an overall process is exemplified in 
the role of the ad hoc Advisory Group of National Drinking Water Experts 
in the preparation of the Drinking Water Directive.18 
16
 Sec (ichring (1995: 205-210). 
r
 A frequently observed (Never 1997: 29-30; Bach 1992) hut rarely corroborated third 
candidate for committee influence is the "socialisation" of committee members over time. 
For a normative account which approaches "arguing", such as that adopted by the Bremen 
research group (|oerges/Never 1997a and ]99~h), systematic European socialisation might 
cause a serious problem because committee members would no longer fully represent their 
home countries and committee opinions would lose legitimacy for their home constituen-
cies. However, the effect may he largely overestimated because committee members still 
spend the bulk of their working time in their home offices and will be socialised predomi-
nantly within this framework. 
IS
 Council Directive 80/778/EEC, above, note 11. On the Directive, see Haigh (1992: 
Chapter 4.4.). 
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In preparing the proposal for a Drinking Water Directive, the 
Commission determined the design of the Directive and elaborated the 
content of its main body, that would primarily outline the scope of the 
Directive, as well as central obligations and ancillary duties of the Member 
States. However, it refrained from selecting the detailed content of a 
number of annexes intended to define the specific standards for drinking 
water, in terms of parameters and their limit values, as well as the measure-
ment techniques and analytical methods for the testing of these parame-
ters. Since this task required expert information which it did not possess, 
the Commission set up the ad hoc Advisory Group of National Drinking 
Water Experts. 
The experts attended in a private capacity but they were nominated by 
the Member States and originated predominantly from specialised state 
agencies like the German Federal Health Agency (Bundesgesundheitsamt). 
The ad hoc Group was given the limited task of advising the Commission 
on the parameters and figures to be inserted into the annexes. During 1974, 
the Group met several times and discussed the details of the annexes on the 
basis of a report written by a French rapporteur. The experts reached 
general agreement on the requirements for healthy drinking water, while 
some issues remained unsettled.19 The Commission mainly adopted the 
experts' conclusions for its proposal of the Directive.20 It can be seen that, 
in this case, the expert opinion was assimilated into the formal decision-
making process. 
The Group had been delegated a limited task embedded within a larger 
legislative project. It was set up to advise the Commission on the appro-
priate quality standards for drinking water from a public health point of 
view, and it was not required to consider a broader range of issues that 
might also have been relevant for the creation of rules on European 
drinking water standards. Because of the restricted scope, the experts 
could rely on established professional criteria concerning such issues as 
toxicity testing, the credibility of epidemiological studies and consumption 
usages. In fact, they referred to standards that had been negotiated 
elsewhere and relied on, in particular, a recommendation of the World 
Health Organisation (WHO).21 Procedurally, the experts were invited to 
deliberate and, as far as possible, reach agreement, but they w'ere not 
mandated to decide anything. 
In this type of arrangement, consensus settles issues and increases the 
relevance of the advisory body at large.22 When disagreement emerges, the 
'" l o r example, the relevance of regulating the total hardness of drinking water remained 
disputed, see Veil. Edom (19S1: 474-47.5). 
-" C O M i o ; .594 final. 2I Ibid. 
11
 See Buitendijk van Schendelen (199.5: .50). Falke/Winter (1996: 567-575) compare the 
consequences of a successful and a failed attempt to achieve consensus in similar working 
groups. 
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Group will be unable to provide clear-cut advice and force the Commission 
to fill the gap on its own. The Commission had no reason to deviate from 
the opinion of the national drinking water experts, as far as their 
consensus reached, but it retained the power to determine the parameters 
in the event that the experts could not reach agreement. Under these 
operating conditions, it was not a viable strategy for a stake-holding 
Member State to send a representative merely to block consensus. This 
approach could not preclude the emergence of near consensus that might 
strongly influence the Commission's choice despite some remaining 
disagreement. In order to promote their interests, Member States would 
have to influence the deliberation process positively. Therefore, they were 
better off sending experts capable of convincing their colleagues of their 
opinion. In short, the arrangement was designed to encourage the Member 
States to send "real" water experts rather than negotiators thereby 
"forcing" them to argue and to pursue their interests by providing reason-
able and convincing arguments on the basis of professionally shared 
criteria. 
If the scientifically sound basis for the parameters and the limit values 
had been the only relevant criteria for the acceptability of the proposal by 
the Member States, then there would have been hardly anything left to 
negotiate within the Council. However, the Expert Group had not 
discussed a wide range of issues which were important to the overall 
acceptability of the directive; for example, its influence on the supply of 
drinking water in the Member States, its impact on domestic legal systems, 
or the expected improvement costs of upgrading the quality of national 
drinking water to the proposed minimum standards. On these issues, 
Member States' interests and national assessments as to the economic, 
financial and administrative implications of the EC standards varied 
considerably. Since the costs of achieving the standards were not uniform 
across the Member States, negotiations in the Council were fractious 
despite the almost unanimous scientific opinion. For example, the Directive 
related to more than 60 parameters whereas German law only checked 16 
parameters; consequently, Germany felt that the costs following from the 
regular measurement and analysis of the parameters were too high.2 ' 
Britain campaigned hard for a less stringent limit value on the content of 
lead in water because much of Britain's water supply is still delivered 
through lead-pipes.24 The Netherlands politicised those parameters in the 
Directive which related directly to the saline content of water because this 
formed a part of its long-term struggle to desalinate the waters of the River 
Rhine.-5 It can be seen that the Expert Group did not pre-empt the negoti-
ations in the Council. 
2
' For the German position sec Stellungnahme des Bundesrates, Drucksache 494 '.5. 
24
 See Haigh (1992: Chapter 4.4). 
" See Kromarek (19X6: .11-32); Veh/Hdom (1981: 474). 
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Because the Directive was based on Articles 100 and 235 EC, before the 
Directive could be adopted by the Council, unanimity of the Member 
States had to be achieved. The intense negotiations in the Council took five 
years of "bargaining": the balancing of established interests. Primarily, the 
Council considered the main body of the Directive. General concerns of the 
Member States as to the perceived "rigidity" of the Directive resulted in the 
incorporation of a number of measures designed to relax the strict legal 
regime.26 The Member States agreed to extend the transition period for 
implementation from two to five years. Furthermore, no less than three new 
exemption clauses were introduced: under certain conditions, there was a 
further extension of the transition period; there was also a provision on the 
temporary infringement of limit values for drinking water abstracted from 
exceptionally bad surface waters; and, as a safeguard clause, the temporary 
lifting of the limit values in emergency situations. Besides altering the 
temporal implementation of the Directive, in some cases, the Council also 
modified the legal status of parameters; for example, it classified the 
chloride and conductivity parameters as non-mandatory "guide-values" 
rather than as binding maximum concentrations. On the issue of lead-
pipes, it added a "commentary", in particularly unclear language, on the 
lead value with the result that the Directive allowed the lead value to be 
exceeded where there is lead-piping, notwithstanding the fact that the 
Directive retains the original, scientifically based figure. 
In short, the Council significantly amended the Commission proposal 
and introduced a number of lacunae in order to produce a text that was 
acceptable to every Member State. It is remarkable, however, that the 
Council resorted to manipulating the impact of the entire Directive on the 
domestic water supply systems and largely refrained from adjusting the 
figures and parameters elaborated by the advisory Expert Group. In fact, it 
was more difficult to bargain over the part of the Directive that had been 
subject to far-reaching expert consensus than over those parts which had 
not been previously subject to expert advice. This strategy of the Member 
States suffered a set back before the European Court of Justice several 
years later. The Court considered a case concerning the definition of the 
"emergency situation" in the safeguard clause contained in the Directive." 
The Court adopted a narrow interpretation of the provision with the result 
that the most important loophole was effectively closed. Whereas the 
Council had introduced this provision to relax the strict provisions of the 
Directive and to facilitate compromise, the Court's interpretation meant 
that the Member States were more firmly bound to the strict limit values of 
the Directive. Accordingly, within the institutional framework, the conclu-
sions of the advisory expert committee did not only affect the negotiation 
process and the design of the Directive. Over time, they also had a serious 
lh
 See preamble to the Directive, above, note 11. 
z
~ See Case 228/87, Prelum umficau di Torino [1988) ECR 5099. 
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impact on the substantive content of the obligations contained in the 
Directive as the Court closed lacunae on the Directive's scope. 
The long and fierce struggle over the Directive within the Council 
suggests that the Member States defended important stakes and did not 
refrain from bargaining. The impact of the committee on the outcome 
cannot simply be explained as an apparently low importance project, nor 
by a general "problem-solving" attitude of the negotiators; rather, it may 
be attributed to the particular position of the expert committee within the 
overall decision-making process. The conscious separation of committee 
deliberations from Council negotiations had the effect of protecting the 
professional discourse of water experts as far as possible from bargaining. 
In the area of drinking water, arguing dominated and facilitated the 
emergence of a professional consensus. States had to send "real" experts -
rather than negotiators pursuing general state interests — to influence the 
deliberation process. A prerequisite for the dominantly discursive interac-
tion of experts was, however, the embeddedness of their deliberations in a 
broader decision-making process. States could afford to send water experts 
precisely because they knew that they retained the opportunity to struggle 
for their aggregate interests in the subsequent negotiations in the Council. 
If the whole Directive had been negotiated in an expert committee, the 
Member States would have been encouraged to send "tougher" negotia-
tors. Similarly, if the Directive had been prepared in the Council, national 
delegations desiring to mitigate implementation costs would have been 
motivated to question the scientific basis of strict limit values. In both 
cases, arguments actually intended to convince another party would have 
been mixed indistinguishably with moves in the bargaining process. The 
risk of misunderstanding would have increased and the negotiators would 
have been less inclined to question the preferences of their states as a 
prerequisite for a meaningful discourse. In these surroundings, the chances 
of achieving professional consensus would have been seriously reduced. 
The degree of professional consensus actually produced by the advisory 
committee proved difficult to challenge in later stages of the decision-
making process. Although negotiators bargained vociferously, they could 
not simply push aside a consensual and scientifically based conclusion 
agreed upon by their own experts. However, the professional consensus did 
not dominate the overall interests of the Member States because it did not 
cover the entire range of relevant "administrative" aspects. Thus, the 
experts' conclusions persisted while national representatives bargained over 
the impact of these conclusions on their domestic water supply systems. 
More generally, advisory expert committees may facilitate, and ratio-
nalise in the Habermasian sense, decision-making, if their task is deliber-
ately limited to the exploration of one set of relevant aspects according to 
agreed upon (professional) criteria. The contribution of committees to 
European governance relies on an institutional barrier that separates their 
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deliberations from the arena of actual decision-making and protects them 
from being contaminated by the inclusion of extraneous components 
which belong elsewhere in the overall decision-making process. 
4. Decision-making in Comitology Committees 
A very different sort of committee is designed to adapt directives to 
"scientific and technical progress". Committees of this type are envisaged 
under virtually all of the environmental directives. In 1975, the 
Environment Council had agreed on a model article28 according to which 
these committees would generally operate under what later came to be 
known as the "regulatory committee (filet) procedure" or "the Ilia 
committee procedure".29 
Establishing a committee of this type generally modifies the applicable 
decision-making procedure. This modification may be assumed to be 
acceptable to the Member States only where benefits of for example, avoid-
ance of stalemate or unforeseen problems, outweigh the costs, such as the 
loss of bargaining power and an increased risk of undesirable decisions. 
Generally, this balance will be particularly favourable if at least one of the 
following three conditions is fulfilled: 
a) a common goal renders even an individually costly committee 
decision generally acceptable, or, 
b) the new procedure does not introduce major changes compared to 
the original decision-making procedure, or 
c) the procedure is limited to the adoption of decisions of minor 
importance. 
With respect to the common goal (a), the establishment of a committee 
touches the distinction between product and process regulation. The 
iMember States will have less difficulty in assigning case-by-case decisions 
to a European committee, where speedy European decision-making 
promises to increase benefits from other issue-areas that may be traded off 
against the risk of undesirable committee decisions. The area of product 
regulation generally allows this trade-off because it contributes to 
removing national obstacles to transboundary trade. '" In contrast, the 
: s
 Sec Council Resolution on the adaptation to technical progress of directives or other 
Community rules on the protection and improvement of the environment, (1975) OJ C 
I68<5. 
27
 In accordance with the "Comitology Decision" of the Council, (1987) OJ L 197/3.1; see 
Meng (1988); Fhlermann (1988). For a description of the procedures, see Vos in this volume. 
"' On the difference between product regulation and process regulation, see Weinstock 
(1984); Rehbinder/Stewart (1985); Scharpf (1996h); Gehring (1997). On foodstuffs and the 
committee-like agency arrangement for pharmaceuticals, see Hankin (1997); Gardener 
(1996); Joerges/Neyer (1997a). 
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costs of European process regulation are usually not matched by overall 
gains in other sectors; consequently, Member States tend, in general, to be 
more reluctant to assign significant powers to comitology committees in 
this area. Accordingly, establishing comitology committees in environ-
mental process regulation may be assumed to rest predominantly on the 
remaining options (b and c). Committees could be expected to be created 
in areas in which the related modification of decision-making procedures is 
modest. Furthermore, for less important issues, such as those of a technical 
nature, it could be expected that decision-making would be left to 
comitology decision-making. However, it is likely that issues which are 
more important are dealt with by the unbridled political process. In this 
Section, the powers and decision-making activities of comitology commit-
tees in three areas of environmental process regulation will be examined 
according to these criteria. 
4.1 The Drinking Water Committee 
The Commission proposal for the Drinking Water Directive included the 
establishment of a regulatory committee (Ilia) that would be generally 
responsible for the adaptation of the annexes to scientific and technical 
progress." These technical and predominantly science-based parts of the 
Directive had been elaborated largely by the ad hoc Group of National 
Drinking Water Experts. '2 Any amendment to the annexes would be based 
on scientific expertise and the specific knowledge of public health experts. 
However, the Commission proposal was heavily contested within the 
Counci l ." Eventually, the final version of the Directive adopted by the 
Council reduced the power of the Drinking Water Committee to the 
adaptation of only one of the annexes that dealt with measurement 
techniques and analytical methods. Every other detail encapsulated in the 
annexes, such as the parameters, the limit values and their legal status 
(mandatory or advisory values) had to be revised according to the normal 
decision-making procedure. In effect, the scope of the Drinking Water 
Committee was not really significant, and in practice the Committee never 
met. 
The Directive suffered from a serious implementation problem.34 Part of 
the difficulty was the fact that numerous parameters of minor importance 
had to be measured regularly and analysed according to specific proce-
dures. Consequently, it became clear that implementation would benefit 
from separating substantive and formal cases of non-compliance. 
Therefore, an ad hoc group of high-level governmental experts of the 
Member States agreed that the annexes of the Drinking Water Directive 
and some other quality standard directives required adaptation and that 
" Above, note 20. <- Above, Section 3. " See Kromarek (1986: 33-36). 
H
 See Krämer (I992). 
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committee-based decision-making was the appropriate way forward. 
However, it was felt that the committee decisions ought not change the 
ambition of the directives and should not have economic implications for 
the Member States.35 The decisions ought to be limited to "minor" issues. 
Against this background, the Commission proposed in 1988 to establish a 
uniform committee procedure which would cover four directives, including 
the Drinking Water Directive.36 It was proposed that the committee would 
participate in the modification of all the annexes of these directives with 
the result that it would be responsible for changing, adding and removing 
parameters, limit values and measurement methods. The Commission 
intended that the committee set up under the directives concerned would 
operate according to the regulatory committee procedure (Ilia), which is 
most widely used in environmental legislation.37 Despite the earlier agree-
ment, a number of Member States blocked the proposal, fearing that the 
committee might adopt costly decisions.38 Thus, the attempt to establish a 
committee competent to modify the relevant annexes failed once again in 
the Council and the project was eventually abandoned in 1990.39 
In order to understand this failure to establish a meaningful comitology 
committee in an area in which an advisory expert committee had been 
quite successful, it is necessary to consider the role of the committee 
proposed by the Commission within the larger decision-making process. 
The function of the proposed committee differed greatly from that of the 
advisory expert committee. Although any amendment of an annex of the 
Directive by a committee decision did not preclude other professional 
advice of drinking water experts being sought, the expert deliberations had 
to be organised either in the form of a new ad hoc committee operating 
under the auspices of the Commission (beyond the remit of the Drinking 
Water Committee's control), or in the form of a working group of the 
committee, thus differentiating its own institutional structure. In both 
cases, the comitology committee would have been the recipient and not the 
producer of this advice. Accordingly, the joint committee for the quality 
standard directives was not designed to benefit the Council negotiations, it 
was intended to replace them. A Member State intending to pursue its 
" Sot the Introductory Note in COM(88) 752 final, 7. 
"' Commission proposal for a Council Directive amending directives 80/778/EEC on 
drinking water, 76<'160/EEC on bathing water, 75/440/EEC on surface water and 79/869/EEC 
on methods of measurement and frequencies of analysis of surface water, COM(89) 478 
final. 
Initially, the Commission had proposed to grant the Member States a right of initiative 
hut amended its proposal after an intervention of the European Parliament, see its amended 
proposal (1989) OJ C MX)IU. 
i s
 See Europe Environment, 27 March 1990. 
'^ In 1995, the Commission adopted a different approach and submitted a fresh proposal 
for a revision of the Drinking Water Directive, (1995) OJ C 131/5, see also its amended 
proposal, (1997) OJ C 21.3/8. 
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overall "national interest", however determined, would have to do so 
within this committee, because there might not be a second stage of 
decision-making. 
Even though the proposed comitology committee could not operate on 
the terms of the advisory expert committee, it was also designed to perform 
a particular function within the larger decision-making process. The 
committee would have constituted the follow-up stage preceded by political 
decision-making on the directive according to the normal procedure. It 
would operate within the margin and according to the criteria contained in 
the Directive. The political pre-decisions envisaged the switch from 
unanimity to qualified majority voting which would have had considerable 
implications for the distribution of bargaining power. The committee would 
seriously soften the voting requirements for follow-up decisions. Before the 
introduction of qualified majority voting for environmental matters inserted 
by the Treaty of Maastricht, the Member States preserved their individual 
veto power according to the unanimity requirement in Articles 100, 235 and 
130s EC, while even the most restrictive comitology committee procedure 
would deprive them of this power resource.40 
The proposal to establish a committee with the power to amend all 
annexes might have been feasible if its activities could have been restricted 
to issues of minor importance. Unfortunately, the pre-decisions did not 
clearly distinguish between minor and major decisions. This endeavour 
was doomed to fail not least because the main body of the Drinking Water 
Directive does not contain all the important provisions, and the relevance 
of the annexes is not limited to mere technicalities. Thus, the committee's 
activity would have been directed only loosely by preceding decisions and 
the committee would have enjoyed a wide margin of discretion. Formally 
at least, the committee was rather powerful and, over time, it might well 
have introduced important changes to the European policy on drinking 
water. The agreement of the Member States not to change the "ambition" 
of the Directive by committee decisions and not to adopt costly decisions 
reflects another attempt to demarcate the line separating minor from 
major decisions. However, this guideline was not formally binding and 
could not, therefore, ensure that it was actually followed in the long run. 
In short, by agreement on the proposal, the Member States would have 
had to accept a major procedural change and they would not have been 
sheltered from undesirable decisions of the utmost national importance. 
411
 One might even argue that the primary intention of establishing comitology commit-
tees in environmental process regulation was to avoid the "joint decision t rap" (Sch.irpf 
1985) that occurred as a consequence of the transfer of a competence to the European level 
and the still low problem-solving capacity at that level. The fact that any change of a unani-
mously agreed directive required once again a unanimous decision threatened to create the 
"problem of obsolescence" (Rehbinder/Stewart 1985: 279) in as dynamic an area as environ-
mental policy-making. 
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Therefore, it is not particularly surprising that some of the Member States 
blocked the envisaged expansion of committee decision-making. 
4.2 The Nitrate Committee 
The Nitrate Committee is an example of a "powerful" committee in 
environmental process regulation that was established successfully and has 
been operating for several years. Late in 1991, the Council adopted unani-
mously the Nitrate Directive41 based on Article 130s EEC. The Directive 
was the first piece of environmental legislation regulating the adverse 
effects of modern farming practices on the environment. The main body of 
the Directive obliges the Member States to monitor their water resources 
for pollution by nitrates, identify areas draining into waters that are 
vulnerable to nitrate pollution and eutrophication, and elaborate and 
apply action plans. A number of annexes contain specific criteria for 
identifying vulnerable areas, the content of action plans, and a code of 
good agricultural practices. Annex III contains the most far-reaching 
specific obligation: annual limits on the amount of manure that can be 
spread. The permitted amounts of manure are gradually lowered: in the 
first four year period, the amount is 210 kg/ha N; thereafter, the rate is 
dropped to 170 kg/ha N. In terms of its legal architecture, the Nitrate 
Directive closely resembles the Drinking Water Directive because core 
obligations are codified in its annexes. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the regulatory Committee established under the 
Nitrate Directive has far-reaching decision-making competences. It is 
empowered to adapt, without any further express constraints or guide-
lines, all annexes to scientific and technical progress. Hypothetically, it 
could seriously tighten, or weaken, the limit values for manure. It is also 
not prevented from introducing new policies such as a detailed limitation 
of the application of industrial fertilisers. The Nitrate Committee, there-
fore, is very powerful in terms of its formal powers. The extent of powers 
might suggest that the Member States had been willing to relax their direct 
control over the future of regulatory processes in the area of nitrates, but 
this approach appears to be in direct contrast to the approach pursued by 
the States in the areas of drinking water and the packaging of waste. 
This apparent contradiction can be explained by viewing the decision to 
create the Nitrate Committee against the backdrop of the general decision-
making process of an EC policy in the area of nitrate pollution. The 
negotiations of the Nitrate Directive coincided with the Conference on 
Political Union42 that was in the process of drafting the Treaty of 
Council Directive 91/676/EEC concerning the protection of waters against pollution 
caused by nitrates from agricultural sources, (1991) OJ L 375/1. On the Directive, see 
Conrad (1992: 188-192). 
4 2
 On this conference, see Corbett (1992). 
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Maastricht. During the course of the Conference negotiations, it became 
clear that for environmental issues based on Article 130s, the co-operation 
procedure would be used and that the unanimity requirement for Council 
decisions would be softened to qualified majority voting. Notwithstanding 
the fact that the Nitrate Directive itself was still adopted under the old 
unanimity requirement, it was already clear to the Member States that any 
subsequent amendments of the Directive would fall under the new proce-
dure contained in Article 130s EC with the result that Member States 
would no longer be able to use their former power of veto. As the new 
Treaty had revised the overall decision-making process, the Member States 
in the Council faced a choice: either the Council could send the amend-
ments through the co-operation procedure, thereby reinforcing the role of 
the European Parliament; or it could establish a comitology committee 
with the effect of empowering the Commission. Faced with this decision, 
the Member States chose to retain control over the development of the 
Community nitrate policy in collaboration with an empowered 
Commission by establishing a comitology committee and virtually 
excluded the Parliament from the decision-making process. However, the 
Council limited the power of the Commission as far as possible by agreeing 
to the contre-filet variant of the regulatory committee procedure (the "Illb 
committee procedure")43 which gives the greatest possible bargaining 
power to the Member States. The agreement on the Nitrate Committee 
and the scope of its powers can be explained therefore as a consequence of 
the Member States' desire to preserve rather than to change, the estab-
lished decision-making procedure as far as possible. 
Although the Nitrate Committee meets regularly, it has not yet adopted 
any formal decision.44 The introduction of new policies or the tightening 
of existing ones is currently not viable because the Member States already 
face serious difficulties to implement the existing policy. Meanwhile, the 
Commission has commenced Treaty infringement proceedings against 
almost every Member State. Against this background, the Netherlands 
asked in 1996, on the basis of an exemption clause, for an approval to 
calculate the limit values for manure in a way that would have the effect of 
allowing values much higher than those normally permitted. This attempt 
to dilute the limit values might have jeopardised the European nitrate 
policy if it had been followed by other Member States. Therefore, the 
Commission submitted the formal proposal for a decision rejecting the 
Dutch application to the Committee. Voting was postponed because the 
Committee members were reluctant to outvote a Member State. However, 
the Netherlands withdrew its application because it had become clear that 
4 !
 The Commission, however, had proposed a Ilia committee procedure, see (1989) OJ (. 
54/4. 
44
 Information on the actual activities of the Nitrate and Packaging Waste Committees is 
based on interviews conducted in Bonn and Brussels. 
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it would not be able to gather a qualified majority in favour of its plan. 
Hence, it was the lack of support from the other Member States that 
prevented a serious backtrack from an established policy. The Dutch action 
emphasises that a Member State may have important interests in a partic-
ular committee "decision" and that it may well be determined to use its 
power resources to influence the outcome even though, in this case, the 
Dutch move was unsuccessful. 
The Nitrate Committee demonstrates the general problem related to 
decision-making in powerful committees. The power of a committee is 
rooted in its ability to take important decisions independently and is, 
therefore, immediately related to a large degree of discretion. Under these 
conditions, the formal activities of a committee are not strictly governed 
by criteria established at a higher political level (i.e. the Council). Yet, the 
less clearly committee decision-making is guided by pre-decisions, the 
more closely will it resemble normal Council negotiations. Hence, 
comitology committees that are powerful in the present understanding 
reflect a low degree of functional differentiation of overall decision-making 
processes. Somewhat paradoxically, the more powerful a committee is in 
terms of its formal "decision-making powers", the less far-reaching conse-
quences will the transfer of a decision from the Council to the committee 
entail. 
4.3 The Packaging Waste Committee 
The Packaging Waste Committee provides the example of a formally 
"weak", albeit operating, comitology committee. The Committee was 
created under the European Parliament and Council Directive 94/62/EC on 
packaging and packaging waste.45 This Directive establishes mandatory 
targets for the recovery and recycling of packaging waste and contains 
quality requirements for packaging; for example, limit values on the 
content of certain heavy metals, as well as the general obligation to accept 
packaging that meets these requirements onto domestic markets.46 Since 
the Packaging Waste Directive was adopted under the co-decision proce-
dure, in accordance with the qualified majority rule in Article 100a EC, 
committee decision-making changed the applicable procedure in a way 
different to that of the proposed Drinking Water Committee because this 
Committee was to be adopted under the unanimity rule. 
The differences between these two committees were not limited to voting 
requirements because the Packaging Waste Committee formed part of an 
•*' (1994) OJ L 365/10. On the directive, see Porter/Butt Philip (199.?); Porter (1995); 
Golub(1996). 
•"' This directive combines a process-related and a product-related component. It started 
as a purely process-related project and moved, during the preparatory process, tacitly 
toward product regulation. See Gehring (1997). 
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ambitious attempt to develop a long-term European policy on packaging 
waste. As the policy requires future revisions according to the normal co-
decision procedure, the primary task of the Committee is not the general 
adaptation of the Directive to scientific and technical progress; it is respon-
sible only for the adaptation to scientific and technical progress of two 
aspects of comparatively minor importance: a marking system and the 
building of a data bank. Consequently, the political pre-decisions in the 
area of packaging waste placed most of the important issues beyond the 
remit of the Committee and strictly limited its potential autonomy in this 
area of decision-making. 
Instead, the Committee was set up primarily to relieve the Council. It 
may adopt specific measures in a number of areas to solve difficulties 
arising from the implementation of the Directive. The Committee has 
been active in these areas and so far it has participated in the adoption of 
two formal decisions on the marking system and the structure of the 
envisaged data bank. These decisions had been prepared by extensive 
discussions and were adopted by written communication. The written 
communication procedure significantly differs from the normal 
committee procedure: the Commission communicates the draft decisions 
to the Committee members but then takes any failure to reply as a 
positive note. Accordingly, negative rather than positive votes are to be 
voiced.47 
Currently, the Committee is in the process of drafting decisions on the 
exemption of certain glass and plastics packaging from the restrictions in 
the Directive relating to the content of heavy metals. To prepare these 
decisions, the Commission has initiated three rounds of open discussion on 
the subject and collected the points of view of the Member States. 
Subsequently, it has summarised the debate and submitted its conclusions 
that were in turn hotly debated in the committee. In a future session of the 
Committee the Commission is expected to submit informally draft 
decisions that will gather sufficient support for adoption. Only then will 
this draft be introduced into the formal committee procedure, pass the 
relevant Commission units, be translated into the official languages, and 
thereafter be decided upon by the Committee.48 
The function of relieving the Council underlines the impact of intro-
ducing a separate stage of secondary decision-making into the overall 
decision-making process. All of the Committee's decisions concerned 
could have been dealt with by the relevant Council working group, as had 
4
 However, no Member State voted in the negative. 
4S
 Thus , Falke's observation that proposals for decisions submitted by the Commission 
are rarely rejected (Falke 1996: US-M^S) primarily reflects the fact that these decisions are 
well prepared in light of the constellation of Member States' interests. It does not imply that 
the Member States refrain from employing their bargaining power to promote their inter-
ests. See van Schendelcn (1996: 32-13). 
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been initially proposed by the Commission. Instead, the decisions are 
taken by a very similar group of Member State representatives but within 
the distinct institutional framework of the Committee. Due to this modifi-
cation, decisions are no longer part of a comprehensive package involving 
numerous other issues. For example, when the particularities of the 
marking system are discussed, the desirability of a European policy on 
packaging waste and the general approach of the Directive are no longer 
subject of contention. In this subject-area, the political pre-decisions define 
a narrow scope for autonomous committee decision-making. Accordingly, 
introducing a second (committee) stage of decision-making following the 
preceding "political" (Council and Parliament) stage significantly modifies 
the surroundings of decision-making in which the stake-holding actors 
operate. 
The surroundings influence those decisions taken within the distinct 
second stage of a larger process. The more precisely the political pre-
decisions structure and direct committee decision-making, the less 
"powerful" a committee is in terms of its ability to adopt decisions 
independently. In this sense, the Packaging Waste Committee is a "weak" 
committee. Nevertheless, "weakness" alone does not promote arguing over 
bargaining. A Member State that is seriously affected by a decision will 
mobilise its bargaining power in any type of comitology committee to 
influence the outcome in its own favour. Admittedly, interaction in weak 
committees may be less prone to fierce bargaining simply because the 
decisions are too unimportant due to the small margins of committee 
autonomy. 
However, the more closely guided a comitology committee is by clear-cut 
and general criteria adopted elsewhere, the more important will be the 
transfer of a decision to a committee. If the Member States agree at the 
political stage on reasonable general criteria, for example because they are 
not aware to which cases these criteria will be applied over time and how 
their parochial interests will be eventually affected, and if committee 
decision-making is closely governed by these criteria when dealing with 
specific cases, the division of decision-making between two functionally 
interdependent stages may well encourage actors to refrain from 
bargaining at both stages. In this case, a committee will be weak in terms 
of a limited margin of discretion but it will be important because it 
discharges an indispensable task for an altogether important decision-
making process. Therefore, weak committees are not necessarily irrelevant; 
they may well reflect a more successful functional differentiation of 
decision-making between the Council (and Parliament) stage and the 
committee stage. 
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5. Informal Functions of Comitology Committees 
If comitology committees convene regularly, they may fulfil additional 
functions not formally envisaged in the directives. The Nitrate Committee 
and the Packaging Waste Committee have evolved into regularly-meeting 
consultation fora, whereas the policy on drinking water has lacked a 
comparable forum because of the inactivity of the Drinking Water 
Committee. The systematic and repeated convening of meetings can be 
advantageous for Community policy-making. For the Commission, 
committee meetings constitute a source of information on the difficulties 
occurring in the implementation process and on the opinion of the 
Member States on the subject. For the Member States committees provide 
an opportunity to explain their approaches and voice their concern about 
the behaviour of other Member States. Within the framework of the 
Packaging Waste Committee, for example, France questioned the German 
uDuales System" (the "green dot" system) because of its discriminatory 
effects on foreign producers. The United Kingdom made clear that it inter-
preted the Directive in such way as to render the Danish ban on beverage 
cans illegal.49 Disputes on the appropriate implementation of a directive 
are thus introduced into the multilateral setting of the Committee and 
withdrawn from the bilateral relationship between a single Member State 
and the Commission. 
One important source of conflict is the correct interpretation of disputed 
or unclear clauses. The Nitrate Committee interpreted a number of 
concepts and clauses that are not clearly defined in the Nitrate Directive. 
For example, it agreed that the mandatory limit values for the application 
of manure per hectare had to be achieved only by the end of the four year 
action programme and were not binding for the whole period. Likewise, it 
agreed on the transformation of the nitrate target into animal units and 
settled the question as to whether the figures stipulated in the annex of the 
Directive applied to the average of a farm or to every part of its lands. 
Currently, it is discussing the nature and extent of monitoring obligations 
and the criteria establishing agricultural effects on surface waters. 
Likewise, the Packaging Waste Committee is endeavouring to elaborate a 
clear-cut definition of "packaging" that is crucial for the proper assessment 
of recovery and recycling quota. 
Over time, a standard procedure has evolved for the interpretation of 
disputed clauses in environmental directives. A dispute is first discussed m 
the committee (stage one). Next, the responsible Commission division 
summarises the exchange of arguments and states its own interpretation of 
4
'' The British position was established as early as 198^ in the famous Danish Bottles case. 
Case 302/86, Commission v. Denmark \ 19X8] ECR 460"7. 
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the disputed clause in a working paper to be examined by the legal service 
of the Commission to check its compliance with European law (stage two). 
Subsequently, the paper is discussed within the committee (stage three), 
and, where necessary, this process may be repeated. 
This standard procedure contributes remarkably to producing discur-
sively reasonable results. In the first round, the Member States discuss a 
disputed interpretation with each other. A stake-holding Member State 
may generate consensus on its preferred view, but to affect the outcome, it 
must (also) convince the Commission. Hence, it may well pursue its own 
interests but it is encouraged to provide reasonable arguments rather than 
rely on its power resources with the effect that the Member State must 
argue rather than bargain. In addition, the Member States are hindered 
from agreeing on a "convenient" solution among themselves because the 
Commission dominates in the second stage. Nevertheless, it would be 
imprudent of the Commission to adopt any "convenient" interpretation 
because it will subsequently have to convince the Member States of its 
choice. Therefore, it is well advised to consider the arguments put forward 
in the preceding discussion and base its judgement on criteria that are 
accepted by the Member States. These criteria are basically provided by the 
directive as well as the acquis communautaire, in short by European law 
that is equally mandatory for all actors involved and enables all actors to 
challenge any interpretation before the European Court of Justice. 
If the Commission reaches and submits to the committee an interpreta-
tion that is not convincing according to these criteria, interested Member 
States may challenge it in the third stage in a - now predominantly legal -
discourse on the basis of the same criteria. However, if an interpretation is 
reasonable and convincing, there will be no point in a stake-holding 
Member State rejecting it because it contradicts national interests. The 
interpretation merely indicates an appropriate application of the directive 
compatible with European law and does not itself oblige the actors to 
anything. In particular, it does not prevent a Member State from imple-
menting the relevant directive according to its own interpretation, but this 
decision raises the risk that "deviant" behaviour may result in Treaty 
infringement proceedings. Likewise, the Commission is not prevented from 
commencing such proceedings notwithstanding a Member State's compli-
ance with a commonly agreed interpretation, but it risks being unsuc-
cessful before the Court. Hence, a common interpretation is not 
meaningless; it may affect behaviour because the powerful actors are well 
advised to consider it when deciding upon their unilateral moves. 
The standard procedure for the committee-supported interpretation of 
directives promises to produce altogether "rational" results in the 
Habermasian sense. It does so by forcing both the Member States and the 
Commission into an exchange of arguments that makes the pursuit of 
interests only promising as far as it is based on the provision of reasonable 
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arguments.50 The influence of comitology committees in this informal 
function relies on their ability to generate consensus and collectively 
remove uncertainty. Like advisory committees, they are influential precisely 
because they do not take the final decisions. 
For the process of European governance, the informal activities of a 
comitology committee may be at least as important as the formal ones.51 
Unfortunately, the formal and informal functions of a comitology 
committee will frequently operate according to different modes of interac-
tion.52 Formal decision-making cannot fully avoid bargaining because the 
Member States will not, and should not, ignore their national interests. 
Informal functions require arguing because they rely on the emergence of 
consensus that actually convinces the participating actors; thus, 
comitology committees are hybrids that must accommodate two different, 
and possibly conflicting, modes of interaction. 
6. Conclusion 
The existence of committees indicates that decision-making processes are 
functionally differentiated. In addition to changes of formal decision-
making procedures, European committees may affect outcomes of 
decision-making processes in two conceptionally distinct ways. They may 
define a particular subset of issues relevant to a larger decision-making 
process and simply re-shape the decision situation in which the partici-
pating actors interact. Under certain conditions they may also provide the 
foundation for a systematic transformation of the mode of interaction 
from bargaining to arguing. These two different types of committee influ-
ence should be analytically distinguished from each other, even though 
they may occur simultaneously in a single case. 
In environmental process regulation, Fluropean comitology committees 
may be formally very powerful. This is true for the proposed Drinking 
*' Similar to the interpretation of unclear terms, informal committee interaction may lead 
to agreement on the deficits of a directive and guide the Commission proposal for a normal 
amendment to be adopted according to the applicable decision-making procedure. This 
function was less relevant in the present cases. 
"" Indeed, the Commission repeatedly attempted to formalise the informal function. In its 
proposals on the Nitrate Directive, (1989) OJ C 54'4 and (1990) OJ C 5112.. and the 
Directive intended to establish a uniform committee procedure for some water directives, 
COM(8S) 751 final, committees were assigned the task of advising the Commission on its 
request on all matters relating to the implementation of the directives. 1 his expansion of 
formal committee activity was rejected by the Member States. 
"
2
 Principally, the informal functions could be discharged by additional advisory commit-
tees. However, it is much easier to motivate "governments" to participate in a comitology 
committee than require a group of governmentally designated experts to attend an ad hoc 
committee set up by the Commission. 
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Water Committee and for the Nitrate Committee. The former was rejected 
by the Member States because it would also have changed the applicable 
decision-making procedure significantly, while the latter was accepted 
precisely because it promised to preserve the established procedure as far 
as possible. These committees have, or were designed to have, very broad 
competences to modify and adjust important parts of the respective 
policies. Their far-reaching formal power is rooted in the absence of strict 
guide-lines established by pre-decisions taken at a hierarchically higher 
level. Therefore, committee decision-making involves wide margins of 
discretion, and decisions may touch important interests of Member States. 
Accordingly, powerful committees will not dramatically redefine the 
bargaining situation and formal decision-making may be expected to 
reflect largely intergovernmental bargaining in the Council. This type of 
committee is not particularly well suited to transform interaction related to 
formal decision-making from bargaining to arguing. 
Other comitology committees, like the Packaging Waste Committee, are 
formally quite weak. Their activities are governed by comparatively clear-
cut and carefully demarcated powers and decision-making criteria. The 
decisions of committees of this type will be more closely guided by the 
relevant political pre-decisions. Accordingly, they enjoy only a compara-
tively small margin of discretion. Decision-making within a weak 
committee will differ more profoundly from the original situation than 
that in a powerful committee. Since a weak committee has less freedom of 
choice, it will on average touch less important national interests. Yet, this 
conclusion does not prove the low relevance of these committees; on the 
contrary, they may well be simultaneously weak in the present under-
standing and important for the related overall decision-making processes, 
if the political (Council) stage is largely limited to establishing generally 
applicable and clear-cut decision criteria, and if committee activity is 
limited to applying these criteria to specific cases. Accordingly, a weak 
committee may reflect a more advanced functional differentiation of 
decision-making. 
Finally, European committees may matter, even though they are formally 
entirely powerless. This is not only true for advisory committees like the cid 
hoc Committee of National Drinking Water Experts but also for 
comitology committees in areas in which they do not take formal 
decisions. This advisory type of committee activity is directed at 
convincing decision-makers of the relevance and reliability of the advice 
given. Interaction in the bargaining mode or the adoption of decisions by 
voting would merely reflect the distribution of bargaining power. To 
produce convincing arguments and reliable information, the participants 
are therefore compelled to interact in the arguing mode. The institutional 
separation of the advisory and the decision-making functions of an overall 
decision-making process provides the necessary protection of discursive 
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interaction from undesirable intervention of bargaining. The empirical 
investigation in this paper suggests that the activities of comitology 
committees in environmental process regulation are, to a large extent, 
related to this advisory and informal function. 
Clearly, committees may well contribute to eroding the crude pursuit of 
national interests and thus promote "deliberative problem-solving" in 
European governance. Generally, this effect may be attributed to the 
functional differentiation of decision-making processes and the delineation 
of areas in which bargaining constitutes the less viable mode of interaction 
for the Member States to pursue their interests. Somewhat paradoxically, 
formally weak committees that enjoy little or no freedom of independent 
choice and which are quite strictly governed by general criteria may modify 
interaction among the participating actors more profoundly than commit-
tees with far-reaching formal powers. In this sense, the extent of a 
committee's formal powers is inversely related to its contribution to 
European governance. 
